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effectual. But when the officer has thus. undertaken to convey a
particular title, and the purchaser takes the title so conveyed, none
other will pass by the deed. That manifestly conveys only the
title of M. Yendo, and those claiming under him. But the plain-
tiffi do not claim under Manuel Yendo, and consequently the deed
does not profess to convey to the purchaser their right.
We conclude that the assessor's deed was inoperative to divest
the plaintiffs of their title; not only because of the invalidity of
the assessment, but because the deed did not convey the title of the
plaintiffs, and consequently that the court erred, in excluding it
from the jury. The court also erred in refusing the instructions
asked by the plaintiffs, and in overruling the motion for s new trial.





It will give us a clearer view of some of the foregoing proposi-
tions, to look at them in the light of one. or t~wo cases. Perhaps.
we cannot better illustrate the truth, that what a judge says, in
pronouncing an opinion, is not strictly authority, nor always re-
liable, though his legal conclusion be correct, than by the leading-
case on the proof of marriage, lo rri vs. Hiller, 4 Bur. 2057;
1 W. El. 632. This was an action for criminal conversation; and
it become necessary, therefore, for the plaintiff to establish his mar-
riage to the lady, with whom the illicit intercourse was alleged to
have been committed by the defendant; and the point decided was,
that evidence of matrimonial cohabitation and repute was not suffi-
cient, but that -what is called .a marriage in fact must be proved.
The same conclusion has been arrived at by every court, English
and American, that has ever had occasion to decide the question,
down to the present day. It is correct, beyond all doubt. The
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same rule prevails in indictments for adultery, polygamy, and the
like; but in other cases, generally, the marriage is sufficiently proved,
primafacie, by evidence of cohabitation and repute.
The reason of the distinction is obvious. The law always pre-
sumes, that every man leads an innocent and moral life, unless the
contrary be shown in the particular case. If, therefore, two per-
sons are living together as husband and wife, professing and reputed
to be married, the law, which must of necessity presume, either that
they are in fact married, or else that they are criminal and immoral
persons, adopts, prima facie, the former conclusion; that is, regards
them innocent. But, in an action for criminal conversation, the
plaintiff's own claim is, that both he and defendant have been hold-
ing a commerce with one woman, such as could be innocent in neither
out of the matrimonial connection. This being proved, both parties
cannot be innocent; and so the law must hold its judgment, that is,
its opinion which of them is married, in suspense, until some con-
trolling evidence is introduced. The same reasoning applies in in-
dictments for adultery and polygamy.
Now, in stating the opinion of the court in Morris vs. Miller,
Lord Mansfield, if we may rely on the reports we have of his ob-
servations, said, that if the evidence of cohabitation and repute,
which proceed from the party's own act, were taken as sufficient, it
"might render persons liable to actions founded upon evidence
made by the persons themselves who should bring the action."
This remark, of a most learned and accomplished judge, true in
itself, yet not of the smallest possible consequence-a fact, but not
a legal reason-has since been mistaken by numerous judges, and,
as far as our observation has extended, by all the text writers on
evidence, for the principle on which these adjudications proceed.
But how do we know this is not the principle, when so many men
have said it is? Simply by the fact, that in all issues, where the
difficulty we stated above does not intervene, the law permits a
party to prove his own marriage by his own cohabitation. And
where the issue, of married or not, arises in the trial of indictments
for polygamy and adultery, and so the cohabitation is the act of
him against whom it is offered, it no more establishes his marriage,
